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Abstract 
We study the welfare effects of non-binding advance price announcements. Applying a 
differentiated Bertrand model with horizontal products and asymmetric information, we find 
that such announcements can help firms to gain information on each other thereby allowing 
them to achieve higher profits. However, our results also show that the overall welfare effects 
of such announcements in a context of heterogeneous products are not as clear-cut as previous 
research in a homogeneous products framework has suggested. We conclude that – although 
non-binding advance price announcements may raise competition concerns – in many 
settings, their positive effects are likely to outweigh the potential detrimental effects on 
welfare.  
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1 Introduction 
Announcing prices or price changes before they become effective is a common practice in a 
number of markets, including transport services and intermediate goods such as cement, 
concrete, asphalt or chemical products. Competition authorities are to some extent concerned 
about the potential welfare-decreasing effects of such practices. In particular, the standard 
theory of harm suggests that by giving advance notice of their price intentions, firms are able 
to coordinate on higher prices, increasing their own profits at the expense of buyers and 
overall welfare.  
 Despite these potential detrimental effects on welfare, authorities are fully aware that there 
might also be non-collusive, welfare-enhancing explanations for the implementation of 
advance price announcements (APAs). Examples include the intention of firms to shift 
demand over time or the customer’s desire to know their costs in advance (e.g., for planning 
purposes). The Horizontal Guidelines of the European Commission (2011) take account of 
this ambiguity by classifying binding advance price announcements as in accordance with 
competition law, whereas private non-binding advance price announcements are considered 
likely to violate competition law and public non-binding advance price announcements 
constitute a grey area.   
 In this paper, we study the welfare effects of non-binding advance price announcements. 
Applying a differentiated Bertrand model with horizontal products and asymmetric 
information, we find that such announcements can help firms to gain information on each 
other thereby allowing them to achieve higher profits. However, our results also show that –  
even in the absence of welfare-enhancing buyer reactions – the overall welfare effects of such 
announcements in a context of heterogeneous products are not as clear-cut as previous 
research in a homogeneous products framework has suggested. We conclude that the net 
welfare effect of non-binding advance price announcements is likely to be positive in the 
circumstances we analyzed.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent Section 2, we 
provide a selective review of the economics literature on communication among firms in 
general and advance price announcements in particular (in Section 2.1), followed by a 
complementary summary of recent antitrust cases in which such announcements played a role 
(in Section 2.2). In Section 3, we introduce private non-binding advance price announcements 
in a standard model of Bertrand competition with differentiated goods, showing their 
implications on both firm profits and overall welfare. In particular, we start off in Section 3.1 
by modeling the state of unknown costs, followed by the state of an unknown demand 
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parameter in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 combines the preceding two sections by assuming more 
than one missing piece of information. Section 3.4 presents the results of several rounds of 
simulations of the respective three states of the model, followed by a brief discussion of 
possible model extensions in Section 3.5. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
2 Advance price announcements in competition theory and practice 
This section presents a selective review of the economics literature on communication among 
firms in general and advance price announcements in particular, followed by a 
complementary summary of recent antitrust cases in which such announcements played a role. 
2.1 Review of the existing literature  
According to basic oligopoly theory, firms have an incentive to coordinate in order to achieve 
supracompetitive prices and therefore greater profits. However, successful collusion regularly 
requires some form of communication among firms. Direct or express communication is the 
measure of first choice in achieving a collusive outcome. Such explicit collusive practices are 
prohibited in most countries, providing incentives for firms to rely on second-best solutions in 
order to achieve some form of tacit collusion. 
 The literature distinguishes between two types of tacit collusion: conscious parallelism and 
concerted action. By definition, conscious parallelism does not include any direct 
communication among firms; however, some mutual understanding of the industry can lead to 
an equilibrium with higher market prices and profits than under competition. Following 
Harrington (2012), the standard example of such a form of behavior is two adjacent gasoline 
stations that can observe price changes and react in a way to stabilize supracompetitive price 
levels. Conscious parallelism is classified as legal by most competition laws. 
 In contrast, concerted actions are located between explicit collusion and conscious 
parallelism in the sense that these actions involve some form of direct communication. 
Importantly, the communication does not involve the respective firms expressing their intent 
to reach a collusive agreement. Nevertheless, the extent of mutual understanding is higher 
than under conscious parallelism (see Harrington 2012) and the direct form of communication 
might be helpful to reach and sustain supracompetitive prices. Examples generally include 
various forms of (public or private) announcements, for example, announcements on future 
pricing policy. Consequently, the competition law treatment of concerted action is somewhat 
of a grey area in most competition laws.  
3 
 
 Given the potential negative welfare effects of concerted action, one would expect greatest 
interest in the study of these forms of communications. However, Harrington (2012)5 and 
Kaplow and Shapiro (2007) note that economic theory has difficulties in answering the 
question of how firms decide whether to explicitly or tacitly collude and how they decide on 
which of the (usually many) possible equilibria to play. These authors note that economic 
theory is equally unable to explain which types of direct communication can be considered 
sufficient in realizing a (tacitly) collusive outcome. 
 In an effort to provide some answers to the puzzles around communication, an early 
literature on focal pricing emphasized the relevance of communication in general and the role 
of ‘focal points’ in coordinating outcomes in strategic situations (Schelling (1960) and 
Scherer (1967) are early applications to conscious parallelism, while Bennett and Collins 
(2010) provide a more recent analysis). Focal points can be defined as points of convergence 
for expectations and therefore provide first answers to the question of how firms might reach 
certain collusive outcomes without express communication.    
 The related literature on cheap talk suggests that non-binding and unverifiable 
communication – with no direct effect on payoffs – may help coordination on a particular 
equilibrium (see, for example, the seminal paper by Farrell (1987) and the survey by Farrell 
and Rabin (1996)). Although such forms of communication may also have no effect – that is 
the players simply ignore the respective information – Farrell and Rabin (1996) show that 
many of these equilibria are in fact implausible.  
 In their survey, Kaplow and Shapiro (2007) point towards a different strand of literature 
that studies the role of communications to convey private information. For example, Athey 
and Bagwell (2001, 2008) allow firms to communicate about private cost information in a 
repeated pricing game, while Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) investigate 
communications when firms observe private but imperfect signals about the past.   
 Guided by early results of experimental economics (and the legal approach to collusion 
more generally6), Kühn (2001) proposes to fight collusion by banning certain types of 
communication between firms that are, on the one hand, particularly likely to facilitate 
collusion but, on the other hand, are unlikely to improve social welfare by enabling some kind 
                                            
5
  As noted by Harrington (2012:3) “[t]he economic theory of collusion – based on equilibrium analysis – 
presumes mutual understanding is complete (that is, the strategy profile is common knowledge) and does not 
deal with how mutual understanding is achieved, nor the extent of coordinated behavior that can result when 
there are gaps in mutual understanding”. 
6
  Kühn (2001:175) generally argues that the legal approach to collusion – that focuses on communication 
instead of evidence from market behavior – should be adopted by the economics profession as well (partly 
because of the apparent difficulties in making inferences from observed market behavior). 
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of procompetitive information communication or exchange7 (e.g., by reducing search costs for 
customers or generally improving market allocations). In particular, Kühn suggests banning 
the following forms of communication: any private discussion of future output prices or 
production plans, individualized information exchanges about past prices and quantities and 
(probably) the exchange of individualized cost and demand data. Most recently, Cooper and 
Kühn (2014) provide an experimental study of how communication facilitates the 
development of stable collusion. Although they find that simply allowing subjects to 
communicate an intent to collude is not sufficient to generate persistent collusion, their 
experiments point to types of communication that do have the potential to facilitate explicit 
collusion. 
 Turning from a general review of the literature on the role of communication to our 
concrete example of advance price announcements8, Marshall et al. (2008) model advance 
price announcements as part of a broader case of explicit collusion in the U.S. vitamins 
industry (and not as separate strategy to reach a tacitly collusive outcome). They differentiate 
between two types of price announcements: ones ‘with future effective date’ and ones ‘with 
immediate effective date’. While the former type of announcement can be retracted before 
becoming effective (i.e., it is non-binding), the latter becomes immediately effective (i.e., it is 
binding). In this context, the authors show that firms in a competitive market only make 
announcements that become immediately effective while firms operating under a collusive 
regime will use price announcements with future effective dates to test whether buyers accept 
a price increase.9    
 Harrington, Hernan-Gonzalez and Kujal (2013) provide experimental evidence on non-
binding price announcements building on earlier contributions by Friedman (1967) or Holt 
and Davis (1990). They find that such agreements increase the frequency of collusion in a 
symmetric duopoly game, but do not facilitate collusion when there are more than two firms 
(or when the two firms are asymmetric). Furthermore, even in the symmetric duopoly world, 
                                            
7
  Bennett and Collins (2010:314ff.) provide a detailed discussion of possible benefits of information sharing. 
Differentiating between the disclosure of information to consumers on the one hand and sharing information 
with suppliers on the other, they argue (with respect to the latter category) that information sharing (1) allow 
firms to benchmark themselves against other firms, (2) can help to improve allocative efficiency, (3) can 
allow firms to understand market trends thereby being able to better match supply with demand, (4) can 
reduce problems of adverse selection, or (5) may be necessary in the context of other types of beneficial 
horizontal agreements (e.g., in the field of research and development).  
8
  Please note that we refrain from discussing the larger existing literature on price leadership as these models 
regularly assume sequential but binding price setting (see, for example, Mouraviev and Rey (2011) for an 
overview).  
9
  Interestingly, Marshall et al. (2008:774) also argue that if price announcements are used as part of a cartel 
agreement, the cartel members would clearly prefer public over private price announcements (as buyers 
could otherwise resist price increases and monitoring efforts within the cartel would increase as well).  
5 
 
they find only little evidence that non-binding price announcements are able to generate stable 
supracompetitive outcomes. More generally, their experimental results provide strong 
evidence that the incremental gain of direct communication (through direct conversations) is 
large compared to indirect communication through non-binding price announcements. The 
gap is found to be increasing with the number of firms and the degree of asymmetry between 
firms.      
 The contribution closest to ours is Blair and Romano (2001) in which the authors consider 
non-binding advance price announcements in a Bertrand model with perfectly homogeneous 
products and asymmetric information about demand and cost conditions. Guided by the more 
general seminal contributions of MacLeod (1985) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1990), they 
find that these announcements have a negative impact on welfare when there is implicit 
exchange of demand information while they have a positive impact on welfare when cost 
uncertainty is resolved. However, the fact that Blair and Romano discuss the more realistic 
setting of heterogeneous products only verbally reduces the practical relevance of their 
approach and findings and, at the same time, suggests the development of a corresponding 
Bertrand model that allows for heterogeneous products. Such a model is developed and 
discussed in Section 3 below.    
2.2   Review of related antitrust cases  
Non-binding advance price announcements have not only been assessed in the academic 
literature, but have been the subject of competition law investigations. Under U.S. antitrust 
law, the unilateral disclosure of information does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
which generally prohibits contract, combination or conspiracy that unreasonably restricts 
trade – as the unilateral disclosure of information does not constitute an agreement that is 
required to violate Section 1. However, such disclosures may, under certain circumstances, 
violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which generally prohibits efforts to monopolize 
(including acts to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize). Among the 
criteria that are relevant to decide on the harmfulness of an unilateral disclosure of 
information are, for example, the nature and quantity of the information disclosed, the 
specificity and context of the information disclosed, whether the disclosure is public or 
private, the nature of industry and market and the existence of procompetitive business 
justifications for the disclosure of information10 (see OECD (2012) for detailed information). 
                                            
10
  From a law perspective, there are important differences between the (unilateral) disclosure of information on 
the one hand and (facilitated) information exchanges via certain platforms (such as trade associations) on the 
other (although, in principle, both types of communication can violate antitrust laws (see, for example, 
6 
 
Interestingly, despite the possibilities of antitrust law to intervene against cases of (anti-
competitive) information disclosure, U.S. antitrust agencies have pursued only a small 
number of cases and only one case proceeded to court (see OECD (2012) for more 
information). In the litigated case11, the U.S. Department of Justice sued eight large U.S. 
airlines and the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATP) for price fixing and therefore a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. ATP acted as a platform used by airlines to 
exchange information, including information on fares. Although part of the information was 
also available to the public (via computer reservation systems), the ATP platform was also 
used for private dialogues on fares among the airlines (including future fare increases, 
restrictions, or elimination of discount fares) and allowed a constant monitoring of rivals’ fare 
changes. Eventually, the case was resolved by a consent decree prohibiting airlines from using 
the ATP platform to coordinate prices for the following 10 years (see Borenstein (1999) and 
Miller (2010) for detailed discussions of the case and its implications).  
 In the European Union, the content of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is comparable to the respective Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act in the United States. As a consequence, competition law enforcement in 
the European Union faces similar challenges in acting against forms of tacit collusion (see 
generally Capobianco (2004) and especially Siciliani (2014) for an overview of the 
possibilities to treat tacit collusion as possible violation of Article 102 TFEU). Under Article 
101 TFEU, cases of information disclosure or information exchange can only be addressed if 
they establish or are part of an agreement, a concerted practice or a decision by an association 
of undertakings. Furthermore, the Horizontal Guidelines of the European Commission (2011) 
clearly state that “private exchanges between competitors of their individualized intentions 
regarding future prices or quantities would normally be considered and fined as cartels 
because they generally have the object of fixing prices or quantities“.12 The guidelines, 
however, acknowledge that there may be efficiency gains by public advance price 
announcements without clarifying under which circumstances they would be sufficient to 
approve non-binding public advance price announcements. With regard to cases in which an 
advance price announcement is effectively binding for the seller, the guidelines state that the 
inability to revise the announcements would normally ensure that there is no infringement of 
competition law. 
                                                                                                                                        
OECD (2010):11ff.)). From an economics perspective, it is not the general type of communication that is of 
key interest, but the effects on market outcomes (as, for example, a collusive equilibrium can also be reached 
and maintained by mutual understanding, i.e., without any form of direct communication).    
11
  United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Company, Civil Action No. 92-2854, filed December 21, 1992. 
12
  See European Commission (2011), C 11/16, n. 74. 
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 Since the 1980s, the European Commission as well as national competition authorities 
have brought several influential cases with a direct relationship to advance price 
announcements. A famous case is Wood Pulp (1984), in which the European Commission 
uncovered a system of (nearly simultaneous) quarterly price announcements (usually some 
weeks or days before the beginning of each quarter), which were non-binding in the sense that 
individual downward renegotiation took place afterwards13 (see Motta (2004) for a detailed 
description). The European Commission prohibited the practice in its decision in 1984 as “… 
the system of quarterly announcements […] constituted in itself, at the very least, an indirect 
exchange of information on future market conduct. […] The fact that prices were published 
well in advance of their entry into effect at the beginning of a new quarter guaranteed that 
other producers had sufficient time to announce their own – corresponding – new prices 
before that quarter and to apply them from the beginning of that quarter.”14 However, the 
Commission’s decision was later overturned by the European Court of Justice15, partly 
because communications arose from price announcements made to customers: “Price 
announcements did not constitute in themselves market behavior which lessened each 
company’s uncertainty as to the future attitude of its competitors because at the time each 
company engaged in these announcements, it could not be sure of the future conduct of the 
others” (Shearman & Sterling (2014:3) summarizes the various joint appeals cases following 
the Commissions’ decision in 1984). 
 More recently, Hall (2014) identifies and describes three competition cases from the 
European container liner shipping industry, the British cement sector and the Dutch mobile 
phone industry. In the EC container shipping case – initiated with dawn raids at companies in 
several European countries in May 2011 and formally opened in November 201316 – the 
European Commission expressed its concerns over the parties’ regular public announcements 
of price increase intentions through press releases on their websites and in the specialized 
trade press. The case is still undecided at the time of this writing. 
 With respect to the UK cement industry, a market investigation by the Competition 
Commission (CC)17 yielded evidence of conduct aimed at restricting competition and aiding 
                                            
13
  It is important to note that the customers demanded the introduction of the announcement system. In fact, the 
announced prices were seen as ceiling prices, i.e., starting points for individual negotiations on the actual 
prices.  
14
  Commission Decision of 19 December 1984 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty 
(IV/29.725 - Wood pulp) OJ L 85/1. 
15
  A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, para. 64. 
16
  European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Container Liner 
Shipping Companies, IP/13/1144, 22 November 2013, Brussels. 
17
  Competition Commission, Aggregates, Cement and Ready-Mix Concrete Market Investigation, Final Report, 
14 January 2014, London. 
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coordination. In addition to several (structural) cement plant divestiture remedies, the CC 
imposed several behavioral remedies including, first, the introduction of a time lag in data 
sharing via an industry association and, second, the prohibition to send generic price 
announcement letters to cement customers; only customer-specific price announcement letters 
remain allowed. By ordering the implementation of the two behavioral measures, the CC 
aimed to reduce market transparency, thereby reducing the possibilities of coordination 
among cement suppliers.  
 In the Dutch mobile phone case, operators made statements at conferences and in the trade 
press concerning commercial plans in general and future prices in particular, before the 
respective measures were actually decided or implemented in-house. The Dutch Authority for 
Consumers and Markets (ACM) investigated this conduct, noting that statements aimed at 
reducing strategic uncertainty in the market may ease coordination among competitors. The 
investigation was closed18 without the imposition of any fines, after the three major mobile-
telecommunication providers in the Netherlands (KPN, T-Mobile and Vodafone) made 
commitments to refrain from such statements. In particular, the companies agreed, first, to 
refrain from publicly announcing commercial plans before they are actually decided internally 
and, second, to give the issue special attention as part of competition compliance workshops.  
 The preceding paragraphs briefly summarize selected competition cases in which some 
form of advance price announcement played a role. These cases suggest that advance price 
announcements is an issue of current important to competition policy. Consequently, we study 
the welfare effects of non-binding advance price announcements in a rigorous model 
framework.  
3 General model 
In this section, we introduce advance price announcements into a standard duopoly model of 
Bertrand competition with differentiated products. We use this model to provide examples of 
an environment where advance price announcements can help firms to sustain a more 
profitable equilibrium than would be possible without such communication. When deciding 
how to model advance price announcements, we aim at representing an industry vulnerable to 
(tacit) collusion. Thus, we envision a market with several collusion-facilitating factors such as 
sufficient concentration, transparency, stability and symmetry.  
                                            
18
  Authority for Consumers and Markets, Investigation into Mobile Operators Concluded, Press Release, 21 
November 2013, The Hague. 
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 Before we continue with the characterization of our model approach, it is important to 
specify the type of advance price announcement we are focusing on in the remainder of the 
paper. The review in the preceding section suggests that a ‘taxonomy of advance price 
announcements’ must (at least19) specify whether the respective announcements are (1) 
binding or non-binding, (2) public or private and (3) used as part of an explicit collusive 
agreement or as device facilitating tacit collusion. In our model approach, we will, first, 
concentrate on non-binding announcements in the sense that firms are able to change the 
announced prices later. Second, we assume that price announcements are public in the sense 
that they can be observed by the two firms and by the buyers. Third, we concentrate on 
advance price announcements as possible tacitly collusive device (i.e., we exclude the case in 
which such announcements are used as part of an explicit collusive agreement).  
 Buyer-related efficiency improvements – such as improved planning abilities – are not 
easily accommodated into our model. We therefore concentrate on an assessment of the 
welfare effects under the extreme assumption that buyers only care about final prices and do 
not react to price announcements.20 If we are unable to find – in such a ‘worst case scenario’ 
from a buyer perspective – a clear welfare loss of non-binding advance price announcements, 
adding the expected efficiencies are likely to result in a positive net welfare effect of such 
agreements. 
 The remainder of this section is structured as follows. In Section 3.1 we start off by 
modeling the state of unknown costs, followed by the state of an unknown demand parameter 
in Section 3.2. Subsequently, Section 3.3 brings the preceding two sections together by 
assuming more than one missing piece of information. After discussing the results of several 
rounds of simulations of the respective three states of the model in Section 3.4, the section is 
closed by a brief discussion of possible model extensions in Section 3.5.   
3.1 Version A: Unknown costs 
We consider an industry with two single-product firms, named firm 1 and firm 2, who 
produce differentiated products at constant marginal costs of  and , respectively. Each 
firm has private information about its own marginal costs.  
 
                                            
19
  Additional degrees of freedom in the design of advance price announcements (from which we abstract in this 
paper) are, for example, (1) the time period from the announcement of the price to the actual transaction, (2) 
the advance announcement of non-price information (such as, for example, costs or business plans) which 
nevertheless can have clear implications on future prices or (3) the type of communication channel that is 
used (e.g., price announcement letters, specialized trade press or online platforms).  
20
  Technically, the same results would be received for the case of private non-binding announcements in which 
buyers do not observe the respective announcement. 
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Firm 1 faces demand  and firm 2 faces demand  as follows:  
  = 
 −  +           (1) 
  = 
 −  +           (2) 
Here,  is the price of firm , 
 is a demand parameter, which is sufficiently large to ensure 
positive demand,  > 0 is the own-price effect and  > 0 represents the effect of a price 
change of the competing product. 
 We start off by assuming that firms know 
,  
, ,  ,   and   with  ≠ . Moreover, 
we assume that the demand of each firm depends more strongly on its own price than on the 
price of the competitor.21 The firms simultaneously set their prices and afterwards demand 
and profits are realized. The stage game described so far is repeated infinitely in each period 
and firms share a common discount factor  < 1. Variables and parameters that change over 
time are indexed . Costs fluctuate every period, which implies that knowledge of rival’s cost 
cannot be improved over time. More technically said, we assume that  and  each follow a 
random walk with  =   +Ω where Ω is an independent and identically distributed 
random variable with Ω)=0 and Var (Ω > 0. There is no correlation between cost 
changes of both firms. However, each firm observes its rival’s cost of the previous period 
before setting its price for the next period (e.g., because financial statements or other reports 
for shareholders are published). We ignore possible joint cost shocks as their implementation 
would not affect our general argument and results. We denote the expectation that firm  has 
of its rival’s cost by . Given the random walk behavior, the expectation is equal to the 
rival’s cost of the previous period, that means  = .  
 As usual in this kind of games, there are multiple equilibria. An obvious equilibrium is the 
repetition of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game with prices as follows: 
 =  !"#"$"#%"! # $& '"  %"%             (3) 
 = "! # $ #% !"#"$&"'"  %"%             (4) 
We call these prices the ‘prices under competition’. However, the more interesting 
equilibrium is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the highest aggregate profits for the 
two firms. We call this the ‘cooperative equilibrium’ or the equilibrium with tacit collusion as 
                                            
21
  This assumption ensures that 4 −  + ² > 0, which gives along with  > 0 the sufficient 
condition for a local maximum. 
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firms set a higher price than under competition, taking the effect of their price increase on the 
competitor’s profit into account. The cooperative equilibrium is achieved when the firms set 
prices as follows (given that the rival always behaved cooperatively in the past): 
* =  
!"#"$"% $& #%"#% ! # $& %"$"
'"  %"%  %" %  
           (5) 
* = "
! # $ %"$&"#%"#% !"#"$&"% $ 
'"  %"%  %" %  
           (6) 
In case of a deviation, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game would be repeated infinitely. 
We assume that firms are patient enough – i.e. the discount factor  is high – to have an 
incentive not to deviate. Unless the expectations perfectly match the true value, the 
aggregated profits are lower than with the prices a monopolist would set knowing   and . 
These monopoly prices are given as follows: 
+ =  
!"#"$"% $ #%"#% ! # $ %"$"
'"  %"%  %" %  
            (7) 
+ = "
! # $ %"$"#%"#% !"#"$"% $ 
'"  %"%  %" %  
            (8) 
Based on this general model set-up, we now incorporate advance price announcements by 
assuming that each period consists of two stages. In stage 1, firms simultaneously announce 
their price intentions, which are observed by the competitor and the buyers. In stage 2, firms 
finally set binding prices which may equal the announcement in stage 1 or any different value. 
We further assume that buyers only care about final prices in their purchasing decision, i.e., 
they ignore the announcements. The idea of ignoring buyer reactions in this baseline model 
allows us to evaluate a ‘worst case scenario’ from the buyer’s perspective that can later be 
compared to possible (welfare-increasing) efficiency effects of advance price announcements. 
This leads us to our first proposition. 
Proposition 1: In a Bertrand duopoly game with differentiated products and asymmetric 
information on costs, firms can achieve joint monopoly profits by introducing non-binding 
advance price announcements. 
Why is the non-binding preannouncement causing any difference? The reason is that firms 
may use the preannouncement to convey hidden information, in our case of their costs. As 
shown above, firms are not able to achieve joint profits equal to the profit of a monopolist if 
they do not know each other’s costs.  
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 However, with the possibility of advance price announcements, there is an equilibrium in 
which each firm first announces the optimal collusive price of its product given the 
information it has. Afterwards, a firm can infer the missing piece of information, namely the 
costs of its rival, and then set the optimal price at the second stage. 
 In order to sustain this equilibrium, it is necessary that implicitly reporting false costs is 
detected and triggers a punishment such as, for example, the infinite repetition of the Nash 
equilibrium of the stage game. Given a sufficient punishment and sufficient valuation of the 
discounted future profits, both firms have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium 
strategy described in the following.  
 In our example, there is an equilibrium where firms announce the following prices at the 
first stage: 
,-, =  
!"#"$"% $& #%"#% ! # $& %"$"
'"  %"%  %" %  
           (9) 
,-, = "
! # $ %"$&"#%"#% !"#"$&"% $ 
'"  %"%  %" %  
           (10) 
These are the optimal collusive prices given the information each firm has. From the 
announcements, each firm is able to infer the missing piece of information by simply solving 
equation 10 or 9, respectively, for the costs of the competitor, resulting in the following 
equations:  
.!/00/1 = 2'"  %"%  %"
 %  3∗5"676# !"% $& #%"#% ! # $& 
%"%  " # %" 
            (11) 
.!/00/1 = 2'"  %"%  %"
 %  3∗5 676#"! %"$&"#%"#% !"#"$&"
%"%  " # %  
            (12) 
Given the inferred information on rivals’ costs, firms are able to set optimal tacit collusion 
prices which are equal to the price a monopolist would charge (and thus allow the realization 
of larger profits than in the absence of advance price announcements). 
 Whereas joint profits of the firms are never decreasing following the introduction of 
advance price announcements in this model, the implications for total welfare, which we 
define as sum of profits and consumer (or buyer) surplus, are less clear-cut. We compare total 
welfare with and without advance price announcements, calculating consumer surplus as 
follows:    
89 =  ∗ [;
!"#%"∗ 5 
"
− < ∗ 
 −  ∗  +  ∗   + ;! #% ∗ 5  − < ∗ 
 −  ∗  +  ∗  ]        (13) 
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 For consumer surplus without advance price announcements, we use * and *, which 
are the prices resulting from the most profitable equilibrium without information exchange. 
As shown above, after the information exchange caused by the advance price announcements, 
firms set +and +. 
 Since the uncertainty about the rival’s cost may induce prices above the monopoly level, 
consumer surplus may increase or decrease, depending on whether firms actually 
underestimated or overestimated the costs of their rival. The size of the change in consumer 
surplus, which is important for the overall welfare implications, crucially depends on the 
parameters, particularly the strength of the cross-price effects ( and ).  
 In particular, it is noteworthy that if the cross-price effects are equal (=), there is no 
change in welfare caused by advance price announcements. This is because the optimal prices 
without information exchange are the same as with knowledge about rival’s cost if the cross-
price effects are equal: 
* − + =   ∗  ∗  −  +  ∗  ∗  −    (14) 
* − + =   ∗  ∗  −  +  ∗  ∗  −     (15) 
With  = , the difference in prices is zero, implying no change in profits, consumer surplus 
as well as welfare. We are summing up this finding in proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: In a Bertrand duopoly game with differentiated products and asymmetric 
information on costs, non-binding advance price announcement have no collusive effect if the 
cross-price effects are equal. 
The general effect of different cross-price effects is illustrated in Figure 1, where we plot the 
changes in welfare due to advance price announcements in a single period for different values 
of , whereas all other parameters (
 =  
 = 60,  =  = 2,  = 1,  =  = 20) are 
fixed. For the expectation each firm has on the rival’s costs, we exemplarily consider four 
cases, namely  =  = 30,  = 30 and  = 10, =10 and  = 30,  =  =
10. The graphs show that if both firms overestimate rival’s cost, there is a (weakly) positive 
welfare effect, whereas the opposite is true if both firms underestimate the rival’s costs in a 
given period. If there is one overestimating firm and one underestimating firm, the welfare 
effect is positive if the cross-price effect of the overestimating firm is higher. 
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Figure 1: Changes in welfare due to APAs when resolving cost uncertainty 
For a game with multiple periods and advance price announcement used in every period, there 
will be periods with welfare gains and periods with welfare losses, thus the overall welfare 
implications of such behavior remain unclear. 
3.2 Version B: Unknown demand parameter 
Instead of the case where firms do not know their rivals’ cost, we now turn to a setting in 
which a demand parameter is unknown. Again, we aim at showing that the introduction of 
advance price announcements can lead to higher profits for firms, but also investigate whether 
buyers suffer from such an implicit information exchange. Such a finding would be 
particularly interesting as Blair and Romano (2001) found in a Bertrand setting with 
homogeneous products that advance price announcements resolving demand uncertainty have 
a different impact for buyers compared to advance price announcements resolving cost 
uncertainty. Differing from their approach, we consider heterogeneous products with firms 
facing the following demand functions: 
  = 
 −  +  + E           (16) 
  = 
 −  +  + E           (17) 
Firms have some private information on their demand, i.e., firm i observes E but not E. 
However, in analogy to the case discussed in Section 3.1., it is common knowledge that  E 
and E each follow a random walk with E =  E + F where F is an independent and 
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identically distributed random variable with F)=0 and Var (F > 0. The firms 
simultaneously set their prices and afterwards demand and profits are realized. The game 
described so far is repeated infinitely in each period and firms share a common discount factor 
 < 1. 
 Again, we introduce advance price announcements in this game by splitting each period 
into two stages. In stage 1, firms simultaneously announce their price intentions (which are 
observed by the competitor and observed, but ignored, by the buyers). In stage 2, firms finally 
set binding prices which may equal the announcement in stage 1 or any different value. This 
leads us to our third proposition. 
Proposition 3: In a Bertrand duopoly game with differentiated products and asymmetric 
information on a demand parameter, firms can achieve joint monopoly profits by introducing 
non-binding advance price announcements. 
Similarly to the model with unknown costs, there is an equilibrium in which firms first 
announce the optimal cooperative prices given their information, which the competitor then 
uses to infer the missing piece of information. The communicated advance price 
announcements here are: 
,-, =  
!"#G"#"$"% $ #%"#% ! #G &# $ %"$"
'"  %"%  %" %  
            (18) 
,-, = "
! #G # $ %"$"#%"#% !"#G"&#"$"% $ 
'"  %"%  %" %  
          (19) 
After observing firm 2’s announcement ,-,, firm 1 is able to solve equation 16 for E 
wheras firm 2 is able to solve equation 15 for E. This gives: 
E.!/00/1 =
2'"  %"%  %" %  3∗5"676# !"#"$"% $ #%"#% ! #G &# $ %"$"
 
       (20) 
E.!/00/1 =
2'"  %"%  %" %  3∗5 676#"! # $ %"$"#%"#% !"#G"&#"$"% $ 
 
       (21) 
Having inferred the actual demand of the competitor, both firms are able to achieve joint 
monopoly profits. Thus, they perform better (in terms of level of profit) than in the absence of 
advance price announcements. 
 As in model version A in Section 3.1, we find that Blair and Romano’s (2002) clear result 
for the case of homogeneous products is not reproducible with differentiated products. 
Whereas they found that advance price announcement that resolve uncertainty concerning 
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demand would always hurt buyers, we find mixed evidence. For instance, Figure 2 shows the 
changes in welfare due to advance price announcements in a single period for different values 
of , whereas all other parameters (
 =  
 = 60,  =  = 2,  = 1,  =  = 20, E =
E = 0) are fixed. For the expectation each firm has on the rival’s demand shock, we 
exemplarily consider four cases, namely E = E = 10, E = 10 and E = −10, E= 
−10 andE = 10, E = E = −10. Here, we find that the case of an overestimation of 
both firms tends to make advance price announcement beneficial from a welfare perspective, 
whereas in case of an underestimation, the opposite is true. In case of equally strong opposing 
misperceptions, the effect of the firm with the higher cross-price effect dominates. For a game 
with multiple periods and advance price announcement used in every period, there will be 
periods with welfare gains and periods with welfare losses, thus the overall welfare 
implications remain unclear. 
 
Figure 2: Changes in welfare due to APAs when resolving demand  
uncertainty (varying b1) 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the result from Section 3.1 – which stated that 
advance price announcements do not have any collusive effect if the cross-price effects are 
equal (b1=b2) – does not hold here. This is clearly shown in Figure 3 below which plots the 
welfare changes for different a1 with b1=1 and all other parameters as above. Here, one can 
see that the positive welfare impact is increasing in  when firm 2 overestimates the costs of 
firm 1, whereas it is decreasing in  when firm 2 underestimates the costs of firm 1.  
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Figure 3: Changes in welfare due to APAs when resolving demand  
uncertainty (varying a1) 
3.3 Version C: More than one missing piece of information 
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we discussed settings in which firms were not informed about exactly 
one piece of information of their competitor. In this section, we relax this assumption and 
allow for the more realistic possibility that more than one piece of information is missing. 
This causes a challenge for the firms as they can still only provide one announcement, 
however, they need to recover more than one piece of information. Obviously, extracting full 
information is now impossible, however, we will show that with two missing pieces of 
information, firms can still achieve strictly higher profits with the information won from the 
announcement than they would have been able to earn without the (imperfect) exchange of 
information. In principle, our finding also holds for more than two missing pieces of 
information. 
 Again, we consider the market characterized in Section 3.2 above with demand given as 
  = 
 −  +  + E           (22) 
  = 
 −  +  + E           (23) 
However, we now assume that not only E is unknown to firm i but  as well. The game is 
again repeated infinitely in each period and firms share a common discount factor  < 1. 
Over time, costs and demand are fluctuating, which we model analogously to Sections 3.1 and 
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3.2 as random walks. Firms observe  and E from the last period and take those values as 
expectation for the current period. 
 At this point, we consider the situation in which still only one advance price announcement 
can be made at the first stage of every period, whereas firms still set final prices at the second 
stage of each period. In contrast to Sections 3.1 and 3.2, firms now cannot fully decipher the 
signal send by the advance price announcement (although we continue to assume that the 
advance price announcement depicts the optimal tacit collusion price given the information of 
the competitor). However, from the given advance price announcements 
,-, =  
!"#G"#"$"% $ &#%"#% ! #G &# $ &%"$"
'"  %"%  %" %  
   (24) 
,-, = "
! #G # $ %"$"&#%"#% !"#G"&#"$"&% $ 
'"  %"%  %" %  
  (25) 
firm 1 can identify a subset of possible E and  that would be in line with the advance price 
announcement, assuming that both firms still stick to the strategy of announcing the optimal 
cooperative price given their information.  
 Usually, both firms will find that the competitor’s announcement differs from the value 
they would expect given the information from the previous period. Without having any 
indication whether the change results entirely from a change in demand, entirely from a 
change in cost or any combination, this does not provide full information. However, the firms 
can improve their situation by adjusting their price in the direction that the advance price 
announcement indicates, calculating the optimal price (assuming that all possible changes are 
equally likely). Sometimes, they will do worse compared to using the prices they would have 
used in the absence of advance price announcements; however, on average, firms will guess 
better than without the additional piece of information and will thus earn higher profits.22 
 Whereas firms would, at least in expectation, benefit from introducing advance price 
announcements, the welfare effects of such announcements in a setting with two unknown 
pieces of information are unclear thereby suggesting the implementation of simulations. 
However, before we turn to a discussion of our simulation approach and results, it is 
important to remark, first, that – in the previous subsections – we were able to demonstrate 
that firms can increase their profits with non-binding advance price announcements in 
situations in which a cooperative equilibrium is viable but profits are restricted due to 
                                            
22
  The idea is generally similar to a problem in which a player should guess two (independently and identically 
distributed) integers between 0 and 100, X and Y, minimizing his error. Getting an additional piece of 
information (e. g., X+Y=Z) would not always improve the optimal guess, but on average. 
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asymmetric information. It should be noted, however, that for a large range of parameters, 
there is a relatively large gap between monopoly profits and profits under Bertrand 
competition, however, a comparatively small gap between profits in the cooperative 
equilibrium under asymmetric information and monopoly profits.  
 Second, the benefits for buyers – i.e. the efficiencies created by non-binding advance price 
announcements – in our model are caused by the phenomenon that firms may price above the 
monopoly price under full information when they face uncertainty (and assume a scenario 
which is better than reality). By using advance price announcements, the uncertainty is 
reduced or resolved and firms learn that a price decrease might be Pareto efficient because 
both their profits and buyer’s surplus would increase.  
3.4 Simulations 
Due to the ambiguity of the welfare effects in all three cases investigated in the previous 
sections, simulations are an appropriate method to identify which effects dominate for large 
parameter ranges. In our case, each simulation includes a number of N games, where each 
game consists of n periods. At the beginning of each game, the parameters 
, 
, , ,  
and  were drawn from a uniform distribution (over the interval given in the respective 
Tables 1 to 3 in the Appendix) and then remained constant. Initial  and  values were also 
drawn at the beginning from the given interval and then evolved as random walk with a 
maximum per period change Δc. In the model of Section 3.2, Δc is 0. For Section 3.2 and 3.3, 
we also draw initial H and H, which then evolved as a random walk with a maximum change 
of ΔH per period.  
 In the model of Section 3.3, the firms calculate which H and which  would make sense 
given that the change indicated by the observed advance price announcement originates only 
from a change in costs or only from a change in demand and then take the average of the two 
possibilities in order to calculate their final price. We report the frequency of games where a 
positive change in welfare was induced by the introduction of advance price announcements. 
The change in welfare, ΔWF, is defined as the difference between the sum of profits and 
buyer’s surplus in the scenario with advance price announcements minus the sum of profits 
and buyer’s surplus in the scenario with tacit collusion without advance price announcements. 
For the model of Section 3.3, we also report the frequency of increasing firm profits, where 
the change in the firm profits, Δπ, is the change in aggregate firm profits between the two 
scenarios. Δπ is always positive in the models with only one unknown parameter, i.e. firms 
are gaining by using advance price announcements.  
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 The results of our simulation exercises are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the Appendix 
referring to the models in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. The simulations support our 
claim that firms on average benefit from the use of advance price announcements, while the 
impact on consumer welfare is ambiguous. In fact, the simulation results suggest that the 
likelihood for a positive welfare effect is (slightly) higher if advance price announcements 
resolve cost uncertainty rather than demand uncertainty. The total welfare loss or gain in all 
simulations is found to be rather small, indicating that the possibility to use the exchanged 
information for more efficient tacit collusion is causing a rather small total effect on welfare. 
3.5 Possible model extensions 
Although our model approach is able to incorporate several important features of advance 
price announcements, we have identified several areas for model extensions as part of future 
research. First, from an efficiency point of view, one of the most intuitive advantages of 
advance price announcements is the creation of possibilities for (efficient) intertemporal 
substitution. For instance, consider a firm that produces a product facing marginal costs of 60 
in period 1 and marginal costs of 30 in period 2. A buyer has a willingness to pay of 100 and 
marginally prefers to buy in period 1 rather than in period 2. The buyer does not observe costs 
and assumes constant prices in the absence of price announcements. Thus, he or she would 
buy in period 1 at price 100, with surplus equal to 0 and firm’s profit of 40. However, if the 
firm credibly announces to decrease its price and finally sets it to 90 in period 2, the buyer 
would buy in period 2, earning a surplus of 10 and the firm’s profit rising to 60. Thus, the 
situation with an advance price announcement would provide a Pareto improvement 
compared to a scenario where advance price announcements are prohibited. 
 Second, we did not incorporate any customer gain from an improved planning ability (due 
to the difficulty in quantifying these gains). However, there are certainly industries in which a 
decent degree of planning reliability is so important to the purchasers that they might even be 
the side demanding the introduction of advance price announcements23.  
 Generally, incorporating those two aspects would strengthen the efficiency-increasing 
effect of non-binding advance price announcements possibly leading to a positive net effect 
on welfare. Given the fact that the detrimental effects on welfare found in our baseline model 
(neglecting the potential efficiency-increasing effects) were rather modest, it seems likely that 
non-binding advance price announcements would be socially desirable if they either induce 
                                            
23
  The wood pulp case mentioned in Section 2.2 above is one example. 
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sufficient buyer reactions or buyers indicate a high preference for a reduction in planning 
uncertainty.  
 Adequate buyer reactions are likely to emerge if the non-binding advance price 
announcements are sufficiently credible. Although plenty of equilibrium constellations are 
generally possible, an example would be buyers with low waiting costs who have an incentive 
to use intertemporal arbitrage possibilities based on a non-binding announcement (if firms 
usually stick to the direction they announced). 
 An important caveat against the presumption that non-advance price announcements are 
welfare-enhancing is that they might actually be a necessary tool to sustaining tacit collusion. 
We assumed throughout the paper that firms would be able to achieve some degree of tacit 
collusion even in the absence of advance price announcements. Considering, for instance, that 
advance price announcements might also allow exchanging information on the (possibly 
heterogeneous) discount factor, it should be kept in mind that the existence of these 
announcements could actually be the key to achieve tacit collusion if firms were not able to 
do so before. 
 Last but not least, future research might consider multiple advance price announcements, 
as with each additional round the likelihood of purely collusive reasons can be expected to 
increase quickly whereas a possible efficiency gain created by the respective information is 
likely to shrink. 
4 Conclusion 
Given the increasing efforts by competition authorities around the world to detect and 
subsequently punish hardcore price-fixing agreements, second-best strategies associated with 
tacit collusion may become attractive to firms seeking to chill competition. While firms might 
find it difficult to implement and monitor such implicit agreements, competition authorities 
face the problem that – in contrast to hard-core cartels – most forms of communication 
between firms are not necessarily welfare-decreasing, but may well be in the interest of 
buyers.   
 In this paper, we have studied the welfare effects of one particular form of communication: 
non-binding advance price announcements. Applying a differentiated Bertrand model with 
horizontal products and asymmetric information, we showed that firms generally have an 
incentive to use such advance price announcements in order to exchange information: such 
information exchange assist them in coordinating on a jointly more profitable equilibrium 
than would be possible without this strategy.  
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 While non-binding advance price announcements may facilitate collusion, our modelling 
and simulation results suggest that buyers can profit from coordination through (non-binding) 
advance price announcements – even under the conservative (efficiency-related) assumption 
that such announcements only avoid cases in which firms (operating under uncertainty) 
accidentally price above the monopoly price. More generally, our results support the 
competition policy approach to these announcements possibly even including a safe harbor 
provision – as soon as it is sufficiently likely that the (additional) procompetitive effects 
outweigh the potential negative effects in the form of elevated price levels. In addition to the 
presence of general industry and market characteristics that affect the likelihood of collusion – 
such as, for example, the number of firms or characteristics of the respective product – 
situations in which procompetitive motives dominate are more likely to be present if, first, the 
announcements are public and reach many buyers; second, buyers are able (and willing) to 
shift demand over time and; third, buyers demand advance knowledge of prices for planning 
purposes. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Simulation results for model with uncertain costs 
N n 
 
       Δc ΔWF>0 
107 20 [80,120] [80,120] [2,6] [2,6] [0,2] [0,2] [20,40] [20,40] 1 52,0% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 20 20 1 52,6% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 0.5 1 20 20 1 53,3% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 1.9 1 20 20 1 51,0% 
107 20 60 60 3 2 [0,1.99] 1 20 20 1 53,1% 
107 25 600 600 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 100 100 2 50,2% 
107 50 600 600 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 100 100 2 50,3% 
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Table 2: Simulation results for model with uncertain demand 
N n 
 
       H H ΔH ΔWF>0 
107 20 [80,120] [80,120] [2,6] [2,6] [0,2] [0,2] [0,20] [0,20] [0,20] [0,20] 2 49,3% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 20 20 0 0 2 49,0% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 0.2 1 20 20 0 0 2 50,4% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 1.9 1 20 20 0 0 2 50,4% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 0.9 1 20 20 0 0 2 45,7% 
107 20 60 60 3 2 [0,1.99] 1 20 20 0 0 2 49,0% 
107 20 60 60 1 2 [0,1.99] 1 20 20 0 0 2 49,2% 
107 20 60 60 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 40 20 0 0 2 49,7% 
107 20 120 60 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 20 20 0 0 2 49,3% 
107 20 120 60 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 40 20 0 0 2 49,2% 
107 20 120 60 2 2 [0,1.99] 1 20 40 0 0 2 49,9% 
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Table 3: Simulation results for model with uncertain demand and uncertain costs 
N n 
 
       Δc H H ΔH Δπ > 0 ΔWF>0 
106 45 [90,360] [90,360] [2,3] [2,3] [0,2] [0,2] [50,90] [50,90] 1 [0,30] [0,30] 1 98,1% 48,0% 
106 60 180 180 2 2 1 0.5 60 60 1 0 0 1 98,2% 48,3% 
106 60 180 180 2 2 1 1 60 60 1 0 0 1 93,6% 41,8% 
106 30 180 180 2 2 1 0.5 60 60 1 0 0 1 92,9% 48,8% 
106 30 360 180 2 2 1 0.5 60 60 1 0 0 1 92,9% 49,7% 
106 30 180 360 2 2 1 0.5 60 60 1 0 0 1 93,0% 48,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
